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Minimising Existence .  
Or How to Stop Worrying and Love the Barcan Formulae*
niCola CiProtti
the paper is intended to provide a full-scale defence of the 
infamous Barcan Formulae. not only do i put forth some argu-
ments, both semantic and metaphysical, against recent criticism; 
i also take pains at supplying some rationale in favour of the 
formal semantics underlying the Formulae, namely possibilist 
quantification. such a task is carried out through an argument 
for Compositional nihilism, according to which nothing but 
mereological simples ever exists, and consequently through an 
informal sketch of the metaphysics of possible worlds grounded 
upon Compositional nihilism. the paper closes by surveying the 
main reasons why the account championed here isn’t defective 
with respect to other possibilist accounts of existence and modal-
ity presently on stage.
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1. Guest Star: SQML
Amongst both modal logicians and metaphysicians of modality the 
debate over Barcan Formula (BF) and Converse Barcan Formula (CBF) 
runs restlessly.1 As is too well-known to deserve nothing but a passing 
mention, some classes of quantified modal logics (QML) do not validate 
the following
(BF) ∀x®ϕx ⊃ ®∀xϕx;
* i wish to thank Arkadiusz Chrudzimski, edgar morscher and tommaso piazza 
for many helpful comments on ancestors of this paper.
1  Barcan Formulae are not peculiar concern to metaphysicians of modality only. As 
a matter of fact, the debate reaches to the philosophy of mathematics; see g. Hellman, 
Mathematics without Numbers, Clarendon press, oxford – new york 1989.
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(CBF) ®∀xϕx ⊃ ∀x®ϕx.
none the less, the main reason why such modal logics are designed 
to resist both BF and CBF is philosophical at its finest. As it happens, 
the Formulae should be denied validity by any «striving-for-contingency 
theorist» (as vittorio morato has felicitously epitomised the issue at 
stake). to see why, let’s firstly sketch a QML system out of (a) – (d) to 
follow and call it SQML.2, 3
(a) propositional logic (PL)
1. ϕ ⊃ (ψ ⊃ ϕ)
2. ϕ ⊃ (ψ ⊃ c)) ⊃ ((ϕ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (ϕ ⊃ c)) 
3. (∼ϕ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ ((∼ϕ ⊃ ∼ψ) ⊃ ϕ) 
Modus ponens (MP): ψ follows from ϕ ⊃ ψ and ϕ
(b) Classical Quantification theory (CQT)
4. ∀aϕ ⊃ ϕa/t, if t is substitutable for a in ϕ (UI)
5. ∀a (ϕ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (ϕ ⊃ ∀aψ), if a does not occur free in ϕ 
generalization (GEN): ∀aϕ follows from ϕa/t
(c) =
6. x = x 
7. x = y ⊃ (ϕ ⊃ ϕ’), where ϕ’ is the result of substituting y for some, 
but not necessarily all, occurrences of x in ϕ, provided that y is substitut-
able for x at those occurrences. 
(d) S5 modal logic (ML)
8. ®(ϕ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (®ϕ ⊃ ®ψ) 
9. ®ϕ ⊃ ϕ 
2  every symbol will be henceforth used autonymously, thereby letting context 
disambiguate where required.
3  With minor diversions, such a system is widely known as SQML after B. linsky 
- e. zalta, In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic, «philosophical perspecti-
ves», 8, 1994, pp. 431-458. see also C. menzel, Actualism, in The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Summer 2005 Edition), edward n. zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/sum2005/entries/actualism/>, and v. morato, Contingency, Possible-Wor-
lds Semantics, and Ontological Commitment, ph.d. dissertation, Università di Bologna 
2005, espec. chap. 1.
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10. ◊ϕ ⊃ ®◊ϕ 
rule of necessitation (RN): ®ϕ follows from ϕ.
in SQML both BF and CBF are derivable as theorems.4 there is 
more than that, however; we also come up with an allegedly disturbing 
upshot, namely (the theorem of) necessary existence (NE), viz.
(NE) ∀x®∃y (y = x).
the derivation of NE in SQML is as straightforward as the follow-
ing:
(1) ∀x∃y (y = x)     [CQT=]
(2) ∃y (a = x)     [EI]
(3) ®∃y (a = x)     [RN]
(4) ∀x®∃y (y = x)     [GEN]
Where (4) is NE.5 since NE is a theorem of SQML, we are therefore 
allowed drawing an even worse consequence, that is, ®NE. many theo-
rists find both unacceptable: for the former draws to the conclusion that 
no individual whatsoever fails to exist in any possible world, while the 
latter states that there could not have been contingent existents. to put it 
otherwise, then, on SQML we are bound to conclude that whatever exists 
does so out of necessity. But this is wildly at odds with the widespread 
and firmly entertained belief that most things exist only contingently. 
For as regards concreta, the only thing that has been widely thought to 
4  For axiomatic proofs see menzel, Actualism, cit.; for tree-validity see r. girle, 
Modal Logics and Philosophy, mc gill – Queen’s University, montreal 2000, chap. 4; for 
natural proofs see J. garson, Modal Logic for Philosophers, Cambridge University press, 
Cambridge 2006, chap. 12.
5  notice that, despite the independence between BF and NE, any SQML lacking 
10 above must be enriched with BF as a further axiom, in that BF is logically true yet not 
syntactically derivable in SQML; on the contrary, CBF does instead admit of a derivation 
in SQML minus 10. Actually, for BF to be derived as a theorem no system weaker than 
B will do, hence the need for 10 or its Brouwersche counterpart. see menzel, Actualism, 
cit., morato, Contingency, cit., p. 20-23, g. Hughes - m. Cresswell, A New Introduction 
to Modal Logic, routledge, london-new york 1996, p. 244 ff. notice further that, while 
classical quantifier rules entail the Formulae, free logics quantifier rules entail neither 
one, and this is regarded by some as a rationale for preferring free-QML over SQML 
(see for instance n. salmon, Existence, in id., Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning, 
oxford University press, oxford – new york 2005, pp. 9-49; C. Chihara, The Worlds 
of Possibility, Clarendon press, oxford – new york 1998).
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necessarily exist is god. it goes without saying, however, that god’s ex-
istence is extremely controversial. As to abstracta such as numbers, sets, 
propositions or properties, their modal status does not go fully undisputed 
either. to sum up, then, it is very hard to accept such a strong claim as 
NE (not to mention its modalised counterpart ®NE). 
it follows in turn that, since even the most undemanding first-order 
modal calculus, viz. SQML, does validate NE, and NE is highly disputable, 
to say the least, so must be SQML. more in detail, what is supposed to be 
controversial with SQML is (some of) its semantic machinery, namely ∀ 
and □ being commutative.6 it is this very machinery, moreover, to make the 
Formulae logically valid. For if classical rules for quantifiers are adopted, 
then there is no choice other than accepting the Formulae, since SQML 
entails them. From the semantic point of view, this is so just because the 
usual condition on models of SQML might be dubbed Never Expand, Never 
Contract: never do domains grow (monotonicity condition) or shrink (anti-
monotonicity condition) as we move across accessible worlds, so that 
(NENC): if wirwk, then everything in the domain of wi is in the 
domain of wk & if wkrwi, then everything in the domain of wk is in the 
domain of wi. 
When NENC is in place, domains are said to be invariant across 
worlds. And this is the semantical effect of countenancing BF + CBF in 
SQML. As previously hinted at, the problem with accepting such condi-
tions is that models in which NENC holds also validate the counterintui-
tive claim to the effect that if something possibly exists, then it exists of 
necessity. to summarise, then: if you like the Formulae, you must abide 
by NENC; but if you abide by NENC, you must swallow NE.7 resist 
NE and you will come up with rejecting the Formulae.
What is worse, moreover, is that according to some the Formulae are 
counterintuitive on independent grounds, that is, even letting NE aside. 
this is so because accepting the Formulae is tantamount to coming to 
terms with possibilia, in that the former involve quantification over the 
latter; and since possibilia are commonly regarded as entia non grata, 
it follows that SQML has really nothing to recommend and therefore 
should be either abandoned or deeply revised, mainly through resorting 
6  in a nutshell, commutivity boils down to treating the semantic clauses for ®-state-
ments and ∀-statements as unexceptionlessly interchangeable. 
7  this holds true for SQML. For some QML such that BF does not entail the 
contracting condition (i.e. moving “downward” across worlds) see J. garson, Unifying 
Quantified Modal Logic, «Journal of philosophical logic», 34, 2005, pp. 621-649.
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to actualist quantification (Kripke models being the most outstanding 
result of such a revision).
Quite recently, however, Bernard linsky and edward zalta (LZ) 
have delivered a seminal paper in which they advocate SQML by way 
of showing that (i) the semantics for the quantifiers involved in SQML, 
namely possibilist quantification (also known as Constant domain se-
mantics, CDS) admits of an interpretation that is entirely acceptable by 
the enemies to possibilia (usually supporters of actualist quantification, 
also known as varying domain semantics: VDS) and that (ii) NE is not 
so upsetting a result as its opponents prima facie take it to be.
in what follows i purport to improve on LZ attempt at giving second 
wind to the Formulae. such a task will be two-stepped. in the first place, 
i shall show why the only non question-begging reading of the Formulae 
entails CDS, and in order to accomplish this i shall expand on LZ ac-
count of possibilist quantification without aligning with them in defence 
of the contingently nonconcrete.8 secondly, i shall sketch a substantive 
account of the interplay between modality and existence according to 
which CDS fares better than VDS with respect to an overall ontological 
claim to be independently advocated.
i shall then conclude by suggesting some reasons why my account 
is no worse off than the main alternatives to be found within the modal 
realist camp. 
2. The Formulae: Pros and Cons
if you believe in possible worlds and, further, take a realist stance 
over their existence – they exist mind-independently and comply with 
LEM – then the Formulae should suit you finely. yet, why is it not so? 
As is widely recognised, the main reason lies in whether quantifiers 
should be regarded as commutative or not with modal operators. For the 
time being, however, let’s lay this question aside, and turn our attention 
downright upon the Formulae. in the present section i intend to argue 
that the Formulae are essential part to PW talk and technology. in the 
section to follow i shall contend that some putative counterexamples to 
them beg the question against matters quantificational.
8  roughly, LZ hold that CDS is acceptable even by actualists on condition that the 
latter countenance contingently nonconcrete objects whose actual existence is suited to 
satisfactorily replace possibilia. the main discomfort with contingently nonconcretes is 
their yielding an even strengthened form of the dilemma david lewis has raised against so-
called ‘magical ersatzism’, for which see d. lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, Blackwell, 
oxford – malden 1986, espec. pp. 174-191. For an insightful discussion of lewis’ dilemma 
see J. divers, Possible Worlds, routledge, london – new york 2002, p. 286 ff.
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to begin with, let’s focus on BF. BF is susceptible of a harmless 
reading: if everything satisfies a given condition ϕ in all accessible worlds, 
then in all accessible worlds everything satisfies ϕ. spelled out this way, 
it sounds like triviality. What’s wrong with it, then? suppose for exam-
ple that ϕ equals to being pink. Hence, if everything is necessarily pink, 
then it straightforwardly follows that any thing at any accessible world 
is pink, since no accessible world is such that some thing exists therein, 
yet is not pink. so far, one is tempted to say, much ado about nothing: 
all in all, this is simply how PW-semantics works. Hence, the Formulae 
could be taken as nothing but an instance of the commitment to so a 
basic semantic constraint that any PW-theorist from the realist camp is 
bound to accept, viz. the so-called principle of possibility (PP):9, 10
(PP) it is possible that p iff there is some possible world w such 
that p at w.
indeed, if possible worlds are to fill semantic roles, that is, if they are 
invoked with a view to making sense of the truth-aptness of our declara-
tive modal sentences, then there is no denying that every well-formed 
declarative modal sentence is to be rated as truth-evaluable, on pain of 
utter semantic failure and, thereby, of discounting realism over possible 
worlds. to state it otherwise: once PP is accepted, the Formulae should 
count as instances of what is called for in order to assure that no possibility 
be left out, viz., that no modal statement be evaluation-free. Hence, if it 
is the case it is necessary that all xs are ϕ, then PP assures that, for any x 
whatsoever, there is no world such that x falls short of being ϕ therein. 
As long as PP is concerned, therefore, it seems one cannot accept the 
antecedent while resisting the consequent.
so far so good. What is contentious with the Formulae, though, is 
the risk of coping with too many a possibility at once. this is best grasped 
upon considering the existentialised version of BF: 
(BF*) ◊∃xϕx ⊃ ∃x◊ϕx. 
As above, it is PP itself to require that, if it is possible that x be ϕ, 
then x is ϕ at least with respect to one possible world w. According to 
PP, such an inference should be warranted: if it is possible that x exist 
9  true, the Formulae are intuitively invalid where ® reads as a tense, deontic or 
epistemic operator. At any rate, this will not bear upon our present question for we are 
here concerned with alethic modalities only; more on this shortly.
10  For this label see divers, Possible Worlds, cit., p. 47, p. 181.
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and be such-and-so, then there is a world where x is such-and-so (the 
same holding, by parity of reasoning, for ∀ and ®). At first glance this 
is no magic, since it is just the canonical conception of PW-semantics. 
resist the Formulae, and you’ll violate PP much in the same way as you 
did were you to reject the claim that it is possible that unicorns exists: if 
the unicorn predicate is well-formed and consistent, then there is some 
world where unicorns exist, or else PP is unsound. there is an allegedly 
compelling reason, however, for the Formulae to be resisted. in a nutshell: 
What if unicorns do not actually exist? 
to put it otherwise, the main retort levelled against BF* is that, while 
de dicto ascriptions aren’t related to any particular individual, the same 
does not hold of de re ones: predication de re is invariably about some 
individual in particular. For, even though it is true that x possibly exists, 
it does not thereby follow there is some actual thing y such that y = x at 
w. the drawback with BF* (and consequently with the Formulae as a 
whole) is just dispensing with such a crucial difference between kinds 
of modal predication. What is wrong with unicorns, for instance, is that 
from the fact that possibly there are unicorns we cannot derive there is 
actually something that somewhere else is a unicorn, simply because it 
could happen there is actually something that, suitably modified, is a uni-
corn in a different world.11 And should one stand unconvinced because 
horses come too close to unicorns, to the effect that actual-worldly horses 
might in fact be changed into unicorns at different worlds, consider the 
following counterexample to BF*, as put forth by John divers:12 
(R) it could have been that (actually childless) richard had a son, 
even though no actual individual is such that it could have been the son 
of richard.
now, there is no denying that the antecedent of R is intuitively true: 
barring some metaphysical oddity undeserving the mention, it is pos-
sible that richard have (or had) a son. it does not follow, though, that 
the actual world is such as to include some individual which is eligible 
for being richard’s son: as a matter of fact, if richard is childless, then 
richard’s son does not exist at the actual world! needless to say: if R is 
sound then BF* is invalid.
in the section to come i shall advance a reply to R related to how 
handle matters quantificational. Basically, it consists in showing how and 
11  For the sake of simplicity, i am here ignoring Kripkean arguments against the 
metaphysical possibility of unicorns or other non-actual natural kinds. 
12  divers, Possible Worlds, cit., p. 213.
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why such counterexamples can be shown to beg the question against 
SQML. i shall also consider the covert import of divers’ case, and show 
that even that can be fruitfully countered.
3. Quantifiers, and Origin
Confront BF* with the following bit of a conversation between A 
and B. A: «John might meet a woman»; B: «Which woman might he 
meet?». even though both utterances are well-formed and sensible, an 
ambiguity between the speakers looms large: as things stand, B is unable 
to understand whether A conversationally implies (i) ‘He needn’t meet 
any particular woman: he might just meet some woman or other’, or (ii) 
‘He might meet some particular woman’, say l. this is tantamount to ask-
ing whether A meant (i) ◊∃x (Wx & mx) or (ii) ∃x (Wx & ◊mx), thereby 
telling apart de dicto wide-scope and de re narrow-scope quantifiers.
my claim is that (i) & (ii) perfectly match what’s going on with 
BF*, for the ambiguity just displayed parallels the criticism against BF* 
exemplified by R: even if it is possible that John meet some woman, 
perhaps there is actually none such that she is possibly made a date by 
John. Whence the aversion to the Formulae: they overlook the platitude 
that one thing is asserting that an x will be picked out from the Women 
set, one different thing is asserting that l, and not someone else, will do. 
Accordingly, the Formulae are intuitively invalid in that they obliterate 
the aforesaid distinction.13
if the present analogy stands, however, we should conclude that R 
is defeasible. in point of fact, nothing prevents us from reading John’s 
case as follows: if (it is true that) John might meet a woman, then the 
individual to be possibly met is a woman, and not – say – a man, a relative, 
or a child. in other words, it might be contended that it is not possible 
for John to meet a woman unless there is some to be met: ‘no woman, 
no meeting’, to paraphrase Bob marley. indeed, if resistance to (ii) is 
fostered by the conviction that it shouldn’t be taken for granted there’ll 
always be some woman to meet, then such a counter is misplaced. For 
if it cannot be granted there’ll always be some woman to meet, then it 
is (i), viz. BF* antecedent, to be false, not (ii), viz. BF* consequent: it is 
not possible that John meet any. the Formulae enthusiast, though, is not 
concerned with (i), because what is at stake is BF* soundness, and not its 
13  the example in the text takes inspiration from a similar case put forth by Jonathan 
Bennett in J. Bennett, A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals, oxford University press, 
oxford – new york 2003, p. 183-189, in spite of Bennett’s relating it to the lewis-stal-
naker debate over Conditional excluded middle instead of Barcan Formulae. 
223Mondi possibili
‘ex falso’ validity. Consequently, if it isn’t in fact possible that John meet 
a woman, much the worse for the antecedent, since BF* would thereby 
be valid no matter what. Antecedent’s being false, then, won’t carry to 
the whole inference. on the contrary, upon assuming it is possible that 
John meet some x such that x is a woman, it is illegitimate to infer that 
no x is such that she is possibly made a date by John just on account 
of matters epistemic, such as our being unwarranted in selecting some 
given woman as the one with respect to which predication de re is in fact 
correct. some women must be eligible for predication de re, however, or 
else BF* would turn out trivially valid.14
How does the foregoing bear upon R? the answer is straightforward: 
What goes for John’s case likewise does for R. Actually, for the anteced-
ent to be true the constraint to be imposed on the truth-conditions for 
quantified sentences is that the range of the quantifiers doesn’t shift in-
between, that is, when moving from the antecedent to the consequent, 
on pain of utter ignoratio elenchi. Hence, the second quantifier must 
read as the first. And since it is uncontroversial that BF* first ∃ varies 
over every accessible world, so should the second. For, if we agree in 
believing to be possible for richard to have a son (if only for the sake of 
the argument) then how to dismiss different worlds as the only suitable 
place to find richard’s son? For, if it is possible that richard have a son, 
then richard’s having none in the actual world entails that he has one in 
some different world. All this sounds trivial, of course. But this is exactly 
the reason why ∃x◊ϕx cannot be interpreted as if the quantifier had its 
range restricted to the actual world, so that it is actual-worldly l (and 
not someone else) to be met by John. thus, rather than asserting there 
is an actual x such that x is ϕ at w, it is legitimate to read ∃x◊ϕx as saying 
there is an x (sans phrase, as it were) that is ϕ at some world, whereas it 
presumably is not-ϕ at some others, including the actual world. 
Accordingly, far from counting as a sound counterexample, R is 
especially instructive in that it sheds light on why the Formulae are this 
animadverted. if the case from John really fits BF*, it is apparent what 
is wrong with R: its unfairness with respect to quantifying-in. As a mat-
ter of fact, R bespeaks the extra proviso that richard’s son belong to 
the set of actual worldly individuals, while this is the very issue at stake. 
in other words, R begs the question against the range of the quantifiers 
14  A further remark: the locution ‘some women must be…’ should not be taken 
literally, as though it entailed that a principle as strong as Axiom B (or even S5) is being 
invoked here. it is just because the only interesting case is the one featuring the truth of 
the antecedent, that i have taken the liberty of infecting the phrase above with spurious 
modality. in no way is it being suggested here that BF* comes out logically true only in 
B or S5.
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involved. recall (i) and (ii): opponents to BF* treat the latter as implying 
that some particular woman is the chosen one, and that’s just fine. But 
then they go on and deny that we are entitled to pick out one amongst 
the Women set. And this they aren’t in turn entitled to infer unless they 
read the second ∃ differently than the first: some one must be eligible on 
pain of falsifying the antecedent. 
However, the real counter divers has possibly in mind by R is much 
subtler than the foregoing. As a matter of fact, his focusing upon such 
a peculiar predicate as ‘being a son of’ is anything but fortuitous. For, 
the reason why R is intended as an ingenuous counterexample to BF* is 
as follows: that some x is such to be richard’s son in some world while 
not so in some other offends the sensible essentialist claim according to 
which origin is not contingent over existence. in fact, far from counting 
as an ordinary property of objects, origin qualifies as the (most salient) 
criterion for transworld identity, so that a at wi and b at wk are the same 
object iff they share the same origin, that is, they derive from the same 
closely-antecedent entities.15 Accordingly, then, the out-and-out defeater 
of BF* is: it is metaphysically impossible there be any individual (whether 
this-worldly or not) such that her coming from the very parents whose 
offspring she is in every world in which they have a biological offspring 
may vary from world to world. Hence R actually counterinstantiates BF* 
to the extent that, even though it is possible for richard to have a son, it 
is false there is an x such that x is possibly richard’s son, as if the selfsame 
individual – richard’s son16 – could originate from richard in wi and not 
originate from richard in wk. Quite to the contrary, from the necessity 
of origin it follows that sameness of origin across different worlds is the 
very criterion needed to transworldly refer to richard’s son rather than 
to some different individual. Hence, from the possibility that richard 
have a son it does not follow that his son is not essentially so, that is, that 
x is not richard’s son in every accessible world in which they both exist. 
even granted, therefore, that quantifiers should go unrestricted all over 
BF*, ∃x◊ϕx is false whereas ϕ stands for ‘being a son of’.
despite its ingenuity, however, this argument is quite inconclusive. 
in the first place, it happens to rely upon a controversial claim as the 
15  the leading proponent of the necessity of origin is of course saul Kripke, but 
such a claim has been also championed by Colin mcginn in C. mcginn, On the Necessity 
of Origin, «Journal of philosophy», 73, 1976, pp. 127-134, and by graeme Forbes in 
g. Forbes, The Metaphysics of Modality, Clarendon press, oxford 1985. even if herself 
unsympathetic to this solution see also p. mackie, How Things Might Have Been . Indivi-
duals, Kinds, and Essential Properties, Clarendon press, oxford 2006. 
16  of course, take ‘richard’s son’ as a placeholder and not as a definite descrip-
tion.
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essentiality of origin.17 But no theorist will be likely to be moved by it, 
and thereby to rebut the Formulae, without preventive commitment to 
the doctrine that certain properties of things are properties they could 
not fail to have, except by not existing. But in so far as this doctrine has 
no adequate proof, it shouldn’t be employed in order to serve a differ-
ent purpose, like assaulting an additional thesis. For, whenever some 
conclusion to be resisted is, all things considered, safer and saner than 
the argument intended to undermine it, then, barring further disadvan-
tages, the trade-off should incline towards the former. Hence, if assailing 
a given claim whose overall plausibility adds to m is carried through an 
argument whose plausibility amounts to n, where n < m, then the initial 
claim should stand undefeated.
Be this as it may, i nevertheless believe divers’ counter to be 
incorrect because of a graver reason. Broadly speaking, divers mis-
construes the alleged counterexample by means of adulterating the 
modality involved. As a matter of fact, BF* is not concerned with 
metaphysical possibility, but rather with the purest alethic possibility, 
namely logical possibility. even assuming that metaphysical modali-
ties are alethically behaved,18 the Formulae are not at all concerned 
with ontological categorising or the like; so they shouldn’t be taken 
as asserting something about the fundamental structure of reality or 
modal space. in reality the Formulae are instead concerned with such 
semantic facts as whether quantifiers and modal operators are or not 
commutative. And in this respect, the conclusion of the argument from 
the necessity of origin, viz.,
(NO) iF ◊∃xϕx tHen ∃x®ϕx
constitutes no reason whatsoever to deny BF* whenever the mo-
dality involved is strictly logical. indeed, the truth of NO does not tell 
against the truth of BF*, in that NO actually entails BF*. Consider the 
consequent of NO. if ◊ is interpreted as pure logical possibility, then: 
if x is necessarily ϕ, then x is ϕ; if x is ϕ, then x is possibly ϕ. But that x 
is possibly ϕ is just what is claimed by the consequent of BF*. We can 
therefore conclude that even the ‘essentialist’ objection against BF* can 
be successfully defeated.
17  Besides mackie, further criticism of the necessity of origin is found in Chihara, 
The Worlds, cit., chap. 2, and n. salmon, Reference and Essence – 2nd Edition, prometheus 
Books, Amherst 2005, p. 196 ff.
18  ® and ◊ are said to be alethically behaved iff the underlying logic validates the 
following inferences (capital letters for the semantic ascent): iF p tHen ◊p; iF ®p 
tHen p. 
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thus the moral to be drawn is: Clearly is BF* invalid if it reads as 
covertly switching from some unspecified world (as mentioned in the 
antecedent) to the actual world (as mentioned in the consequent). to 
this respect, however, not only have we argued that this needn’t be so; 
we have also taken pains at showing that R is not fallacy-free as regards 
the semantics of the quantifiers involved: if one takes the second ∃ (re-
spectively, the first ∀ for BF) as wide as possible, that is, as ranging over 
the whole set D of individuals (and not merely over some pre-assigned 
sub-domain d such that d ⊂ D), what BF* asserts is clear-cut enough. 
since the supporter of the Formulae takes ‘everything’ and ‘some’ at 
face value, viz. to whatever world the assignments of elements of D hap-
pen to belong, the conflation of de re and de dicto quantified statements 
mirrors quite naturally the structure of modal space. no wonder, then, 
this turns out so.19 Hence, even though the Formulae conflation of de 
re and de dicto possibility might at first strike us as in contrast with our 
prior modal intuitions, the latter are not to be counted on; at least, not 
necessarily so. As far as i know, on the other hand, no sound alethic 
counterexample to the Formulae has been provided to date as long as 
quantifiers read univocally across each Formula. As i have tried to show, 
the counter that there are possibilities de dicto that are not possibilities 
de re lands wide of the mark, in that it carries an unspoken devotion to 
the set of actually existing individuals.
However, it should be clear by now that since the Formulae crucially 
depend for their plausibility on how quantifiers are to be read, there is no 
hope to convincingly support them without merging deeper into matters 
semantic. indeed, if the Formulae are to be well-credited on account of 
CDS, why should CDS be conferred alike plausibility?
3.1 Possibilism vs . Actualism
the debate over the validity of BF and CBF thus discloses a deeper 
divide between the parties to the dispute. in a nutshell, such a divide 
boils down to the following: How to relate being and existence? two 
main answers are serviceable: (a) possibilism, (b) Actualism. given that 
LZ devote a great deal of their paper to exposing and criticising most 
19  Forbes’ famous counterexamples are therefore convincing only if either BF or 
CBF are met with covertly actualist instances (see g. Forbes, The Metaphysics of Modality, 
Clarendon press, oxford 1985, p. 23 ff.). Quite to the contrary, if the interpretation of 
quantifiers is kept fixed throughout, Forbes’ cases fare as non-starters. if i got him right, 
moreover, martin davies seems to similarly complain against unwarranted actualistically-
oriented readings of SQML quantifiers: see m. davies, Meaning, Quantification, Necessity. 
Themes in Philosophical Logic, routledge and Kegan paul, london 1981, pp. 220-222.
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of actualist theories currently on offer, i shall presently limit myself to 
rehearsing some pros with possibilism.
While Actualism contends that everything that exists is actual, pos-
sibilism claims that domains of quantification must contain no less than 
all the possible objects, and not merely the objects actually existing (how 
each theorist from the possibilist camp treats impossible objects needn’t 
concern us in the remainder). As a result, possibilism reads quantifiers 
as existentially unloaded: ∃xϕx means that there is an x such that x is ϕ, 
without this implying that x actually exists. this is in turn made possible 
by resorting to one and the same domain of quantification for every world. 
Usually, when asked why to endorse CDS, possibilists reply it is for the sake 
of classical quantifier rules, in that the denotation function is never relativ-
ised to subsets of D. they allege this is the best overall strategy conducive 
to the rescue of UI, viz. ∀xϕx ⊃ ϕt, where t is free for x in ϕ. UI relies in 
fact upon whether or not the object denoted by t falls within the range of 
the quantifier; if domains of quantification may vary across worlds as in 
accordance with VDS, it cannot be taken for granted that t denotes at each 
world. Hence, the inference as it stands is no more logically valid.
needless to say, salvaging the inference is one and the same with 
defending the Formulae: as it happens, BF and CBF come out unscathed 
only on account of CDS. once UI is denied unexceptionable validity, 
there is no way for deriving either Formula. roughly speaking, this is so 
because (the denotation of) t might exist in worlds different than the one 
over which the quantifier ranges.
According to CDS, moreover, not only are the Formulae made in-
nocuous. What is most important is that no ambiguity between different 
meanings for the quantifiers will be lingering on anymore. As a matter 
of fact, CDS has no need to highlight actual world existence through 
distinguishing different kinds of quantifiers or resorting to free-QML; by 
employing one single domain and no denotation function, possibilists are 
in fact left with further freedom of movement in that they can introduce 
existence as a syntactic predicate in order to highlight some further ontic 
fact, such as the concern for the actual world, thus fittingly mimicking 
actualist VDS semantics, according to which quantifiers are to be treated 
as existentially loaded so that ‘there is’ cannot be divorced from ‘there 
exists’. possibilists, however, take no care of such a reluctance to distin-
guish the two senses because they claim that CDS and VDS are not on 
a par as to expressive power: in so far as one is willing to accept NENC 
and employ unloaded quantifiers, VDS can be simulated by CDS, while 
the converse does not hold.20 As a matter of fact, possibilists are allowed 
20  so argue both LZ and max Cresswell in m. Cresswell, In Defence of the Barcan 
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referring to any sort of entity included in the domain without there being 
need of distinguishing between existing and nonexisting ones. 
Quite to the contrary, actualists cannot simulate CDS without some-
how coming to terms with possible objects, whereas the very countenance 
of such entities seems to infringe the hallmark of Actualism, viz. that 
everything that exists is actual. For, a major discomfort with VSD is its 
half-way commitment to possible objects: while actualists are inclined to 
quantify over possible worlds, they refuse to do the same with respect to 
certain world-making elements such as possible individuals. the reason 
why they do so is that they claim that possible worlds are actual, albeit 
abstract, entities, while only possible individuals are to be regarded as 
genuine possibilia. this contention is of course debatable, if only because 
(as LZ have suggested) actualists’ abstract entities suspiciously look like 
genuine possibilia.21
eventually we can come to terms with NE, that is, the main dis-
comfort with SQML. CDS makes NE tolerable since, short of entailing 
that everything has necessary existence, it just asserts that everything is 
necessarily identical to itself; and this is quite a weak claim to agree to. 
For, once quantifiers are deprived of existential import, the theorem is 
concerned with such a platitude as the claim that all existentially con-
strued sentences are true only in domains containing at least one member. 
since on classical logic a formula is logically true if true in every non-empty 
domain, no wonder that the same goes for modal logics, to the extent 
that the latter are proper extensions of the former. 
Basically, then, NE is innocent because supporters of CDS employ 
quantifiers only for the sake of telling apart valid and invalid inferences 
concerned with predicate logic. to put it otherwise, possibilists hold that 
quantifiers should serve the sole purpose of sanctioning correct patterns 
of reasoning involving multiple generality, and not of settling matters 
existential. For, in order to accomplish the latter task, many possibilists 
Formula, «logique et Analyse», 135-136, 1991, pp. 271-282. However, the primacy of 
CDS over VDS does not go uncontested: see m. Fitting - r. mendelsohn, First–Order 
Modal Logic, Kluwer, dordercht – Boston – london, 1998, espec. chaps. 4, 8. However, 
their claim that VDS and CDS are interchangeable is in turn suspect because it is cen-
tred on a technique drawn from free logics, namely admitting empty domains, which 
possibilism parts company with.
21  linsky - zalta, In Defense, cit., p. 445. i submit that such an ambiguity on the part 
of actualists is likely to depend on their flat refusal of analysing away modal notions from 
the metalanguage. Chris menzel’s or Charles Chihara’s deflationist approaches to modality 
(as expounded in C. menzel, The True Modal Logic, «Journal of philosophical logic», 
20, 1991, pp. 331-374, and in Chihara, The Worlds, cit., espec. chaps 5-8) might be telling 
exception to the extent that one is able to make sense, roughly, of how any tarskian in 
spirit semantics is all there is to provide a satisfying account of PW-semantics. 
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will resort to an overt non-logical predicate, viz. ‘exist(s)’, being allowed 
for having different extensions at different worlds.22 
All this notwithstanding, it is my conviction that the foregoing rea-
sons for preferring CDS over VDS are not decisive. moreover, even if LZ 
are right in contending that no actualist account can in the end dodge 
covert commitment to possible objects, if only in the metalanguage, the 
great divide has not yet been settled. For the whole issue revolves around 
whether to accept or not such a semantic constraint as NENC. But it is 
apparent we eventually came to a dead-end. Upon resorting to semantics 
in order to settle matters of existence, we ended up with confronting with 
existence assumptions once again: what reasons, if any, militate for the 
claim (i) that objects that exist in a world continue to do so with respect 
to any other world, and (ii) that no further objects come into existence 
as we move across different worlds? For, granted that NENC allows for 
a simpler semantics, how to warrant the very claim that no object ever 
comes into or gets out of existence?
At this stage it is to be suspected that the parties to the dispute are 
on the verge of talking past each other. However robustly one could man-
age to back the Formulae, such efforts are likely to be useless against the 
actualist-oriented refusal to read the quantifiers as unrestricted all over. 
However sensible LZ actualist-friendly interpretation of SQML might 
look, it is hardly conclusive: if you cannot make sense of fixed domains 
for the quantifiers, then you will not make sense of the Formula either. As 
a result, defending the Formulae is an idle task in so far as their defence 
comes across much-disputed matters over what there is and there’s not. 
it is no far-fetched a claim that, aside from technical elegance and sim-
plicity, possibilist quantification has no decisive lead over actualist one. 
none the less, all there is to SQML is not, perhaps, just matter of taste. 
even granting that Quine, dummett and Wright are right in holding that 
the objects over which standard quantifiers range are those that exist, it 
doesn’t follow that matters of existence consist only in fixing the right 
domain of quantification, and that’s that. Aside from the possibilism 
vs. Actualism debate, QML-semantics for the quantifiers comes in fact 
in so many varieties that it cannot by itself settle such controversies or 
22  For crisp remarks over the debate ‘loaded vs. Unloaded’ see d. lewis, Noneism 
or Allism?, «mind», 99, 1990, pp. 23-31. As to existence’s varying in extensions across 
worlds, it must be stressed that any theorist who holds relativised predication to be 
utterly inconsistent will likewise do for the existence predicate. Accordingly, then, the 
above claim is immaterial. All things considered this is not that worrisome since it is very 
likely that the enemy to relativised predication is a counterpart theorist, as such having 
no need of the existence predicate. 
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otherwise put them at rest.23 therefore, for these to be resolved, we must 
turn elsewhere. For it seems there is more to existence than semantics. 
lurking behind are, for instance, matters of vagueness and composition. 
therefore, it is now time for philosophical argument to set the stage. in 
what is left we shall bite the bullet and put forth philosophical arguments 
intended to confer a bit more appeal to CDS and NENC. to anticipate 
a little, i shall argue that possibilism stems most naturally from Com-
positional nihilism (CN), and that the latter is not so implausible as an 
overall ontological claim. 
3. The Problem of the Many: An Argument for Compositional Nihilism
We saw above that possibilism and Actualism differ over what really 
exists. While the former maintains that such objects as the lord of the 
rings and santa Klaus are in principle no different than our old familiar 
mailman, the latter sticks unabashedly with the actual-worldly, ordinary 
objects: mailmen, chairs, tables, trees and the like. this is why resorting to 
existentially unloaded quantifiers cannot by itself settle the dispute: anyone 
holding there is an unbridgeable gap between daily objects and fairy tales as 
to their ontic status is not likely to be convinced to rebut Actualism simply 
by invoking existentially unloaded quantifiers. For it is just because many 
theorists believe daily objects to massively differ from trolls and unicorns 
that possibilism is charged with confusing what actually and what possibly 
exists.24 let’s now try and sabotage such a firmly-held conviction by asking: 
What if not even these ordinary actual things were to exist?
As a matter of fact, it can be urged that no composite entity such as 
chairs, tables, trees, iguanas, ants, plankton, spores (and even people) do 
exist. such a view originates from a peculiar solution to a well-known prob-
lem about material constitution, the so-called problem of the many.25
23  three kinds of domain are usually distinguished: (i) disjoint domains, with no 
transworld identity (counterpart-theoretic semantics), (ii) Fixed domains, (iii) overlap-
ping domains, with transworld identity. Furthermore, (iii) will vary in accordance with 
whether either monotonicity or anti-monotonicity hold (when both hold (iii) can – but 
need not – collapse into (ii)). For details see r. girle, Possible Worlds, mcgill-Queen’s 
University press, montreal 2003, chap. 3. 
24  in any event, really stating what actualists have in mind when stressing what 
the main difference between actual things and possibilia comes to is not an easy task at 
all. in fact they cannot stick with the claim that only actual things can be experienced 
of, on pain of clearing their own ontology of abstract entities too. But they simply can’t 
do that, or else they will dispense with the best suited proxies for genuine possibilia. so 
what else do they mean by holding there is no more clear-cut ontic difference than the 
one obtaining between actual and possible objects? 
25  see for example p. Unger, There Are No Ordinary Things, «synthese», 41, 1979, 
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to begin with, suppose that commonplace objects do exist; suppose 
it is true that the chair where i am sitting right now exists, that is, is an 
irreducible feature of the world (as such, it will be included in the domain 
of actual-worldly objects). Call my chair ‘Chair’. Assume that Chair oc-
cupies a certain portion of space at t, say s. it is sensible, therefore, to 
assume the existence of a set which has as its members all and only those 
material simples that compose Chair at t. Consequently, there is such a set 
that we hereby name ‘set’. set contains all and only the material simples 
that compose Chair at t; at least, set turns out to be sufficient for some 
collection of material simples to compose a chair at a time t. We can then 
draw to the following: the members of set have what it takes for Chair 
to count as a chair at t; now, since Chair is a chair and since set contains 
all and only the simples that compose Chair at t, those elements manage 
to satisfy (what we might dub as) a chair-constituting Condition at t, viz. 
sufficiency in respect to chairhood: it is in fact apparent that set has all 
it is required in order to comply with the Condition.
now problems start to peep out. Allegedly, set is very large; still, 
the mereological fusion of its members doesn’t take up all that much 
room. As a matter of fact, there are a lot of things left over, some of them 
being very close to the members of set.26 Consider some simple in the 
neighbourhood of Chair’s left front leg which is not a member of set at 
t and call it ‘left’. Consider further some outermost simple on Chair’s 
right back leg which is a member of set at t, and call it ‘right’. We are 
now in a position to characterise a new set of simples (call it set*) as fol-
lows: set* includes all the simples found in set except right, and set* 
contains no other element except left. As a result, each of our two sets 
has exactly one member the other lacks, and so neither set is a subset of 
the other. if we agree to call the fusion of set at t ‘Fusion’, and the fusion 
of set* at t ‘Fusion*’, then we will also realise that, on the assumption 
of classical mereology, neither Fusion nor Fusion* is a part of the other, 
even if both the intersection of the two sets and the overlap of the two 
fusions are huge.
pp. 117-154; id., The Problem of the Many, «midwest studies in philosophy», 5, 1980, pp. 
411-68. A must-have about these topics is m. rea (ed.), Material Constitution, rowman & 
littlefield, lanham – Boulder – new york – oxford 1997. see also B. Weatherson, The 
Problem of the Many, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2005 Edition), 
edward n. zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/problem-
of-many/>. 
26  ‘Being very close’ is an ambiguous predicate, of course. We want it to change into 
a vague one, by stipulating that it denotes a real interval between at least one element 
from the mereological fusion of set and at least one neighbour not included in set. please 
remark that s too is taken to have fuzzy boundaries.
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let’s now focus upon set*. its members at t differ only very minutely 
from set’s. no doubt, moreover, that set*’s elements satisfy the chair-
constituting Condition as well: what set* is composed of is sufficient to 
make a chair out of it. But then there is no reason to suppose the following 
‘no-difference’ principle to be false: 
(ND) if x is a paradigm Φ (Φ might stand for ‘horse’, ‘chair’, ‘hu-
man being’ or what have you: at any event, take it as a sortal) and y is an 
entity that differs from x in any respect relevant to being a Φ only very 
minutely, then y is Φ.
on the face of it, the principle is sound: how can very small dif-
ferences make it the case that a chair is a chair no more? How can the 
replacement of minuscule bundles of molecules make a difference be-
tween a paradigm chair and something not being a chair at all? But if 
ND is sound it cannot be denied that the chair-composing Condition is 
insensitive to differences as overwhelmingly insignificant as those hold-
ing between the members of set and of set*. As a consequence, we are 
entitled to believe that if the fusion at t of members of one of these sets 
is a chair at t, the fusion at t of the members of the other set is a chair at 
t as well. this is puzzling, however. sensible though as it may sound, ND 
is deadly in that it triggers a sorites paradox. the reason is that, upon 
accepting it, locations start to get crowded at t. For Fusion is located in 
s at t, but Fusion* too is located in s at t. And since we have agreed that 
Fusion is a chair at t, then we are committed to the claim that Fusion* 
is a chair at t too.
so how many chairs are in s at t? didn’t we suppose from the outset 
that Chair was the only chair occupying s at t? Well, we might still hope 
we were then caught in a blunder; perhaps we clumsily conferred three 
different names to the same object. But this won’t do, however. in point 
of fact, Fusion is not identical to Fusion*, for Fusion has right as a part 
at t while Fusion* has not right as a part at t; and no object both does 
and does not have something as a part at the same time. so it would seem 
that we have at least two chairs in s at t, contrary to what we assumed 
at the outset: reductio.
We can now move to the strived-for last step: iF, if Chair exists 
then a contradiction obtains, tHen Chair does not exist. As is easily 
seen, the foregoing argument can be generalised to any composite entity 
because we agreed that ND holds for any composite entity whatsoever. 
it in fact is ND to yield the contradiction, and to do it no matter what, 
since resistance to ND is also troublesome: if one denies it, then one is 
not entitled to assert that there is one chair only in s. For Fusion* isn’t 
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less paradigmatic as a chair than is Fusion: since neither is a paradigm 
chair, then it is wholly conventional which one satisfies at t in s the 
chair-constituting Condition. Hence many different entities are allowed 
to simultaneously satisfy it in s. But this contradicts again our starting 
assumption that only Chair exists in s a t. 
Hence the argument for CN can be got into an argument-schema 
whose conclusion is: there are no such things as composite entities.27 
this adds up to minimizing existence (ME): only very minuscule things 
really exist, and these are the purest mereological simples (whatever they 
in fact amount to).
4. ME and Domains: Actualism Sabotaged
As a matter of fact, ME does not bear at all upon the question as 
to what such elements are in the actual world (subatomic particles or 
what have you). the argument is more encompassing since it draws to 
the conclusion that, for any composite object whatsoever, there really 
nothing is over and above its constituents, without committing itself to 
any empirical theory about the nature of such constituents. thus ME 
just claims that, whatever composite objects are constituted of, this 
‘whatever’ is what quantifiers should range over. if sound, ME is likely to 
raise some worries for actualists with respect to dealing with interpreted 
model structures, namely universes of discourse. since ME shows that 
nothing but simples does exist, it follows that composition is somewhat 
arbitrary, this depending on issues unconnected with semantics. Hence, 
whenever actualists contend the privileged domain of quantification to 
be the one consisting of actual-worldly individuals, such as our old mail-
man and his bike, because there is a nonnegotiable difference between 
actual and possible things, the aforesaid argument allows possibilists to 
retort that not even the former do exist, and therefore that the seem-
ingly rock-bottom difference rests on no firm ground. And since there 
is no need to tell apart mailmen and trolls, for neither exist, the need to 
distinguish between different domains will also dramatically decrease. 
so the actualist charge according to which possibilism illegally conflates 
what does and what might exist needs revision, to say the least. in fact, 
ME threatens the opportunity of sensibly distinguishing between the 
27  For the record: while Unger is a (former) full-blown CN, this being viewed as 
unexceptionable, more recently peter van inwagen and trenton merricks have argued 
(with some differences) for soft CN, according to which the only composite objects to 
exist are living things, such as tadpoles, crickets, humans and the like: see p. van inwagen, 
Material Beings, Cornell University press, ithaca – london 1990; t. merricks, Objects 
and Persons, oxford University press, oxford – new york 2001.
234 nicola Ciprotti
content of different domains since the alleged difference between – say 
– horses and unicorns doesn’t cut any philosophical ice; and if VDS is 
fostered by underlying insights about what counts as real, then ME is 
intended just to shake those very insights. thus, when actualists contend 
that such fictional entities as Hamlet don’t exist because they are not 
found in the actual world, ME supplies possibilists with the following 
retort: neither ordinary people do exist, for that matter; thus, since 
actuality has been pinned down to mereological simples, actualists must 
accept genuine possibilia if they want to avail themselves of mimicking 
reference to composite entities; and to this extent, commitment to the 
actual world won’t be enough because ME undercuts the very prospect 
of distinguishing within the actual world between supposedly-ordinary 
things and supposedly-fictional ones.
it is my contention that exploiting ME further could allow CDS to 
take the lead over VDS. this should be accomplished by way of showing 
that all there is to constitute any possible object is already included in the 
fixed domain of simples. Accordingly, both ordinary things such as mail-
men and more exotic ones such as trolls will be found inside D, for both 
will be grown out of recombining simples and properties. technically, 
this is to be done through plural quantification along the lines of such a 
system as PFO+.28 letting technicalities aside, the underlying ideas can 
be informally sketched out as follows.
replace every occurrence of: 
(a) ‘there is an x such that’ with ‘there are xs such that’; 
(b) ‘for every’ with ‘whenever there are xs such that’; 
(c) ‘is part of’ with ‘are among’, so that the xs are among the ys iff 
whenever something is one of the xs is one of the ys as well; 
(d) ‘is identical to’ with ‘are the same things as’, so that the xs are 
the same things as the ys iff for any thing, it is one of the xs iff is one of 
the ys as well. 
(e) every singular predicate with a plural predicate: ‘being P’ becomes 
‘being arranged P-wise’, which becomes in turn ‘are arranged P-wise’.29
28  see Ø. linnebo, Plural Quantification, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Winter 2004 Edition), e. zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2004/en-
tries/plural-quant/>; see also g. Boolos, To Be is To Be the Value of a Variable (or To Be 
is To Be the Values of Some Variables), «Journal of philosophy», 81, 1984, pp. 430-439; p. 
van inwagen, Material Beings, cit., pp. 23-28; Ø. linnebo, Plural Quantification Exposed, 
«noûs» 37, 2003, pp. 71-92. 
29  notice this is basically why we need an extension of the simplest plural quan-
tification language: predicates can be non-distributive over some of the singular terms 
involved.
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rather than pursuing the formal modelling, i’ll devote the remainder 
to the philosophical rationale for the chosen type of model. more in detail, 
i shall tackle the following topics. First, discussing what looks as the most 
pressing objection to ME. second, suggesting some reasons why despite 
initial implausibility ME sits well with supporting possibilism.
As to the main objection, it sounds like this: «ME merely pushes 
matters one step farther, but it is no real solution to the dispute between 
CDS and VDS. even though it is true that composite entities don’t exist, 
you haven’t yet advanced any argument for fixed domains. For, whatever 
one fills domains with, it is still to be explained why the same stuff has to 
exist in all accessible worlds. to this extent, it is really no difference to 
fill domains with simples rather than composites, for you’re likely to face 
the very same question: Why any simple whatsoever should exist in every 
accessible world? ME says nothing about that. moreover, the appeal to 
CN discloses a gross misunderstanding of Actualism; in fact, Actualism 
is not a claim as to what there really exists but, rather, a claim as to the 
modal status of whatever happens to exist, viz. being actual; hence, if you 
should succeed in showing that only simples exist, much the worse for 
composites. But this wouldn’t count as an argument against the actualist 
conflation of existence and actuality».
to state it otherwise, the retort has it that, even provided that ME 
supplies a good counter against actualists’ too facile intuition between 
what counts as actual and what does not, it just readdresses the old prob-
lem without meeting it with solution. For supporters of VDS want the 
possibilist to show why the domain must be one and the same, regardless 
of its content: whether it includes simples or more complex stuff is an 
otiose concern. to sum up, then, the task we are confronted with is ex-
plaining how every different accessible world can be built out of simples 
without falling prey to actual-world chauvinism: how to avoid taking 
possible worlds as entities somehow expanding the actual world?
even though this objection is troublesome, i don’t believe ME to be 
more committed to actual-world chauvinism than any competing theory. 
Well, perhaps it is in some extent, yet not in a greater one than that infect-
ing any different account of possible worlds currently on offer.
prior to arguing for this, however, i wish to insist on why ME does 
not imply that what the actual world is made of exhausts what is found 
in D. this is so firstly because of distribution. Basically, stuff can be dif-
ferently distributed across worlds: if an object can have a spatiotemporal 
position other than the one it in fact has, then we will have two differ-
ent possible worlds (and not just one) sharing the same elements, even 
though variously arranged. Hence, distribution is what ‘wise-predicates’ 
are really about. An example will help clarifying this point. Consider 
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clocks: whenever you want to know what time it is, you are likely to 
check your watch and take it as a unified object. But when your watch is 
out of order and your watch-repairer shows you the damaged cogwheel, 
you are not likely to take your watch as a unified object anymore, or else 
you wouldn’t ask her to trade the old cogwheel for a working one. even 
if the foregoing example is wholly intraworld, in that the difference be-
tween the scattered and the unified watch is just temporal – assembled 
at t1, disassembled at t2, assembled again at t3 – nothing interferes with 
extending such a picture to transworld relationships, so that predicates 
are differently satisfied at worlds depending on how stuff is spread out 
in each world. For example: suppose that w is a world where clocks are 
never disassembled on account of certain metaphysical facts, and w* 
is a world where the converse holds: cogwheels are never assembled. 
therefore, even if the simples are numerically the same in each world, 
the predicate ‘being arranged clock-wise’ will be satisfied at w but not 
at w*. this in turn entails that w and w* are different. this case might 
be improved so as to amount to a full-blown theory of possible worlds. 
this will consists in regarding possible worlds as plural predicate-satis-
fiers for different arrangements of simples, so that the plural predicate 
‘being arranged troll-wise’ is satisfied at world w iff certain fusions of 
simples from D are arranged such-and-such at w. 
secondly, D is not confined to the furniture of the actual world 
because different possible worlds can be seen as variously recombining 
elements from D, and recombination can occur though copy (thereby 
making ME consistent with counterpart-theoretic semantics). suppose 
for the sake of the argument that D contains just simples a, b, c, d. take 
now a world w. it hasn’t to be taken for granted that w is confined to 
including just a, b, c, d, if only differently distributed. it might be also 
the case that w is made up by duplicates of the starting elements, thus 
being constituted – say – by a, a, a, b, b, c, d. insofar as worlds are not 
set-theoretic entities, it could be maintained that w and the actual word 
differ as to their content.
Admittedly, the real problem ME faces is how to deal with less-popu-
lated-than-D worlds. For if PP is sound we are bound to recognize the 
existence of worlds where only a and b exist – ontologically diminished 
worlds, so to speak. Why to maintain, then, that such worlds feature 
c and d as well? this is a serious problem for which the only solution 
consistent with PP is to downright stick to the conflation of actuality 
and possibility into being through existentially unloaded quantifiers. it is 
then well-advised, albeit quite discomforting, to maintain that as long as 
less complex worlds are concerned, ME cannot play any significant role. 
in such a case, possibilism can be supported only by semantic devices 
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such as the ones already mentioned. in any event, it is not this case to 
make the present account worse off than other varieties of possibilism. 
rather, both ME and other possibilist accounts are presumably on a par 
as regards how to cope with less complex worlds.
What is most important is that the formal dressing of ME should suf-
fer from no disadvantage with respect to any modal metaphysics currently 
on offer inside the realist camp: it seems to enjoy every benefit shared by 
other accounts without featuring any additional drawback. As it happens, 
ME faces no problems which do not also arise for other theories of modal-
ity. moreover, ME exhibits the following pros: (i) it avoids taking NE as 
unpalatably denying contingent existence by means of reading the quanti-
fiers as unloaded; (ii) it is consistent both with predication as relativised 
at worlds (such as LZ’s or meinongian possibilism) and with unrestricted 
predication (such as counterpart-theoretic possibilism) in that simples 
are not disallowed duplication across worlds, as required by Counterpart 
theory; (iii) it ensures that Barcan Formulae are derivable, thus requiring 
no divorcing from CQT=. Finally, and despite appearances to the contrary, 
(iv) it’s likely to take no preliminary stance as to whether worlds are to 
be regarded as concreta or abstracta. For, although the argument for CN 
is solely concerned with physical entities, it is not thereby implied that 
possible worlds should be conceived of as spatiotemporal entities only. 
in truth, even non-physical worlds can be accommodated within ME as 
long as non-physical entities are conceived of as devoid of parts. For, if 
no non-physical object can be made up by parts, being instead absolutely 
simple in nature, then ME won’t be at odds with any such world. What 
will be needed in such a case is just to augment D with every non-physical 
simple to be reckoned with across modal space. Hence we would come up 
with a proper extension of D, D* including every non-physical simple in 
addition to the physical simples already included in D. And this extension 
is likely to tell the whole story about non-physical worlds.
Finally, ME is not worse off than rival accounts of possible worlds with 
respect to actual-world chauvinism. this is best seen upon considering the 
most serious worry every view of possible worlds has to reckon with, viz. 
the problem of alien properties. roughly, these are properties that are not 
instantiated by any object with which we are acquainted, or (and more 
importantly) such that are not analysable as conjunctions built up from 
constituents that are all instantiated in the actual world. take for instance 
unicorns. Unicorns might be regarded as sum of (parts of) white-coats, 
(parts of) hooves, (parts of) horns, (parts of) feathered wings and so on, 
whereas every part of unicorns is found in the actual world. the problem 
lurking here is that, as long as we look for things which recombine individu-
als drawn from the actual world, there is no difficulty in generating more 
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and more objects, such as unicorns. After all, unicorns merely recombine 
items all taken from the actual world: there is nothing radically alien in 
unicorns, for to be a unicorn is to have certain parts that instantiate certain 
properties, and to have those parts arranged in a peculiar way. Accordingly, 
the property being a unicorn is not so foreign. in a sense, it can be analysed 
out of properties with which we are acquainted: take a horse, change some 
of its properties and you’ll end up with a unicorn. But this does not hold 
in general. if some alien #*° entity is possible, then there is a world where 
alien simples are arranged #*°-wise. this simple fact shows by itself that 
distribution & recombination do not exhaust what there is in D, since 
they cannot provide us with the means for dealing with alien individuals 
such as #*°, their properties being in fact unnameable. Accordingly, the fact 
that alien properties cannot be analysed through actual properties makes 
it almost impossible to talk about them: they are ineffable, as it were. yet, 
PP requires that there be worlds such that some of their parts instantiate 
properties which are alien to the actual world. But what are they? it is not 
possible to answer, since such primitives cannot even be thought of, let 
alone expressed through predicates.
to plug this gap is a head-aching quandary. indeed, it is likely to 
stand as the most demanding task any PW-theorist has to cope with, to 
the point that some regard this difficulty as utterly intractable. it is in fact 
contended that once the concern with alien properties gets the upper 
hand, there is no way for any theory of modality to get rid of the charge of 
actual-world chauvinism. Be this as it may, ME poses no peculiar problem 
in this respect either: if alien properties are troublesome for any theory of 
modality inside and – i dare say – even outside the realist camp, then ME 
is just no exception to this. But no theory can be charged with inadequacy 
just because of its inability to satisfactorily deal with what rival theories 
are likewise unable to solve. Quite to the contrary, the problems attaching 
to alien properties point to what any PW-theorist should steer clear of, 
namely taking conceivability as a guide to metaphysical possibility. For 
the tension between PP and alien properties shows that the claim that 
our ability to conceive of a scenario where p obtains should count as a 
reason for supposing that p is metaphysically possible is at odds with the 
sensible refusal of taking the inconceivability of p as a reason for suppos-
ing that p is metaphysically impossible.30
30  Anyone interested in these fascinating matters should refer to t. szabó gendler 
- J. Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Clarendon press, oxford 2002.
